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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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ARAB STATES - ISRAEL: Geneva talks more productive
yesterday.

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ARAB STATES - ISRAEL: YESTERDAY'S MEETING OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI MILITARY NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA WAS MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN THE PREVIOUS SESSION.

THE ISRAELIS OUTLINED TWO DISENGAGEMENT "MODELS" WHICH, WHILE COINED IN GENERALITIES, CONTAINED SOME SPECIFICS ON THE EXTENT OF WITHDRAWAL AND THE DISPOSITION OF FORCES. UN GENERAL SIILASVUO HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN AFTER THE SESSION ON JANUARY 2 THAT THE TALKS WOULD SOUR IF THEY DID NOT SOON TAKE UP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, BUT HE IS NOW MORE OPTIMISTIC.

THE FIRST OF THE ISRAELI MODELS--A PLAN ALREADY ADVANCED PUBLICLY BY PRIME MINISTER MEIR--IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE TO EGYPT. IT FEATURES THE SEPARATION OF ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN POSITIONS BY A UN ZONE THAT WOULD EXTEND TO A DEPTH OF 12 KILOMETERS ALONG BOTH BANKS OF THE CANAL. THE UN ZONE WOULD BE FLANKED BY 10-KILOMETER-WIDE EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI "SECURITY ZONES" IN WHICH ONLY LIGHTLY ARMED TROOPS COULD BE STATIONED.

THE SECOND MODEL, DEVELOPED FROM AN EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL AND ISRAELI COUNTERPROPOSAL DURING THE TALKS AT KILOMETER 101, WOULD PLACE THE MAIN EGYPTIAN FORCE ON THE WEST BANK OF THE CANAL AND THE MAIN ISRAELI FORCE BEHIND A LINE 35 KILOMETERS EAST OF THE CANAL. IN FRONT OF THEIR MAIN FORCES, BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE 10-KILOMETER SECURITY ZONES SIMILAR TO THOSE IN THE FIRST MODEL. THIS CONCEPT WOULD GIVE EGYPT AT LEAST A TOKEN FORCE ALONG THE EAST BANK. A 15-KILOMETER UN ZONE WOULD SEPARATE THE TWO SECURITY ZONES.

THE EGYPTIANS SHOWED SOME INTEREST IN THE SECOND MODEL, BUT THEY COMPLAINED THAT THE ISRAELIS ADVANCED IT AS A GENERAL CONCEPT RATHER THAN A FIRM PROPOSAL. THEY SAID THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THE TWO SIDES COULD REACH AGREEMENT ON "DETAILS," ONCE SPECIFIC DISENGAGEMENT TERMS ARE PROPOSED.

(continued)

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EGYPT WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT TERMS, IMPLICIT IN THE ISRAELI MODEL, THAT WOULD REQUIRE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ITS SECOND AND THIRD ARMIES FROM THE EAST BANK. THE EGYPTIANS ARE PROBABLY ENCOURAGED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT RULING OUT A DIS-ENGAGEMENT THAT WOULD LEAVE SOME EGYPTIAN FORCES IN THE SINAI.



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
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